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Abstract 
This article proposes to approach issues around the self and its derivate concepts such as 
motivation through a methodology of rearticulation. For this, we build on the idea 
developed in the (broadly) Vygotskian tradition of the self as mediated by cultural 
artifacts in activity, viewed as a transformative social process that reconfigures sense and 
meaning. We aim at suggesting these potentials by rearticulating activities in which 
people display (represent, avow, reflect, expose, externalize, etc.) their motives. Most 
contemporary ‘motivational technologies’ stage a pragmatic self-calculation. For some, 
these technologies confirm a common-sense, managerial self; others read them as a 
‘poetics of practice’ that performs and produces new motives and selves in a liminal space 
of discursive creativity. These two readings are superseded as we – with art theory from 
Vygotsky through Brecht to Groys, Bourriaud and Rancière – consider drug counsellors’ 
experiments with aesthetic practices of self-display in which sense is reconfigured as dis-
sensus, as meaning deferred. Aesthetics provide a lens through which we can appreciate 
how an artifact-mediation can be also a struggle for recognition that reconstitutes 
emerging selves, senses, and motives. 
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Introduction and general approach 
In the summer of 2015, at a group session in a drug counselling facility, a young 
woman, whom we shall call Sue, says: 
But I guess, too, I sometimes experience, that, when I’m doing/feeling as bad as I can ever possibly 
get1 … then I get, like, even more motivated that, “why, I can get even worse!” You know – 
sometimes when everything is going to hell, I think: “You know what? Fuck that!” 
Sue is talking about herself – or, to put it in a slightly different way: about her self. 
Sue seems to address the care of her self, admitting to the counsellors and researchers that 
she sometimes does not care – and is even motivated for getting worse. This motive seems 
obviously irrational. But displaying motives as irrational is disavowing them. We might 
wonder, then: Is her self divided, perhaps in an accountable and responsible part and 
another part that is the opposite? If Dr. Jekyll (or is it Mr. Hyde pretending to be Dr. 
Jekyll?) thus talks about Mr. Hyde, is that still a self at all?  
The example is not a philosophical thought-experiment. As we shall describe 
further below, the occasion was staged partly as research, but the counsellors who were 
present did not exactly jump in surprise: This is the kind of thing clients often do say to 
counsellors, who are then faced with the task of recognizing clients’ rationality, or 
irrationally, or, somehow, both. It is a well-known quandary, but it is not an easy one. One 
aspect is cognitive and relates to the obvious contradictions in such utterances: What is the 




1  In Danish: “Når jeg har det aller-, aller-, allerværst”. The verb “har det” is untranslatable. It is 
close to “doing” as in “how are you doing today?”, but connotes more affectivity, invoking 
something akin to a phenomenological Befindlichkeit, Heidegger’s term for ‘finding one-self’.  
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Here is where we begin: in the middle of things, with problems facing real people 
engaged in a more or less well-known practice. The point of doing so is to suggest a way 
to understand the self, and its concomitant or derivative issues such as ‘motives’ or 
‘motivation’, since the self is first of all practiced, made and handled. It is not an entity 
which we can observe on its own. 
This makes for a complex form of analysis. Firstly, it requires taking seriously the 
traditions and conceptualizations through which such practices of the self have emerged 
and have been articulated. Secondly, these practices must be rearticulated theoretically as 
practices of the self. Thirdly, that rearticulation must proceed not as a purely theoretical 
writing, but in dialogue with efforts to transform practices, since these make visible the 
presuppositions and implications of those practices and the selves they make. 
Theoretically informed practice studies find their relevance in just such transformative, 
innovative, even ‘revolutionary’ attempts, where premises otherwise taken for granted are 
confronted (Nissen, 2013b). 
We can call this a methodology of rearticulation, because it articulates anew what 
is already articulated. We do not cherish such complexity for its own sake, but there is no 
way to avoid it, if we wish to engage with real issues in real practices. The real world, its 
people and our doings, are always-already articulated. However, those articulations are 
often limited and problematic in clinical as well as other practices. It is tempting, then, to 
push those articulations aside as irrelevant or wrong, and begin from scratch. This is the 
classic impulse of Modernist scientism, which has driven most of psychology, even 
including some kinds of critical psychology. But the virgin soil on which such social 
science seeks to build its theoretical edifice is itself imagined and constructed as such. We 
must work critically, if we want to understand ‘the self’ and ‘ourselves’. This approach 
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based on critique has its own history in critical psychologies, from the ‘ideology critique’ 
of the 1970s, through discursive psychologies of the 1990s, and to the ‘second order 
psychology’ and ‘post-psychology’ of today (see Nissen, 2020).   
Possibly, some readers will expect that we in this text either remain within the 
traditions of the given – in this case, ‘clinical’ – practices, or discuss the self in theoretical 
terms, perhaps using ethnographic data, but staying safely at a distance from practitioners’ 
own (clinical, social work) knowledge and culture. After all, these are different academic 
disciplines and communities, and it is easier to remain within one. But the upshot is 
generally either rather conservative or rather utopian. To steer clear of those temptations in 
the following, we aim to show rearticulation as a way forward. 
Part of our agenda is to suggest that the broadly Vygotskian tradition provides 
resources for this project of rearticulation. Much has happened since Vygotsky, and we 
cherish the plurality of the contributions in this tradition, which is why we propose to call 
this approach socio-cultural-historical activity theory (SCHAT). Viewing the ‘self’ as an 
object in a socio-cultural-historical activity mediated with artifacts (e.g. Vygotsky, 1980) 
is a way to cut across disciplinary boundaries and allow (performing and reflecting) new 
kinds of practice under new conditions, and with new technologies. This implies 
understanding articulation as never merely an exchange of immaterial signs. Another part 
of our agenda is to point to some limits of SCHAT, when it comes to paradoxical motives 
such as those presented by Sue at the beginning of this text. 
In particular, we will be considering aesthetic performances and productions as 
ways to transform and overcome clinical practice. We are not reviewing the numerous 
attempts to use aesthetics as means to clinical ends. Rather, we continue a range of 
aesthetic theorists, from Vygotsky to Groys and Rancière, and think of aesthetics as not 
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only independent of function (as classically proposed by Baumgarten and Kant), but as 
superseding function by questioning and transforming it.     
Learning from the counsellors’ experiments with ‘aesthetic documentation’, we 
will even try to show that utterances like Sue’s above can be relevantly understood as an 
aesthetic performance or production, better than as psychotherapy – provided we use a 
wide concept of aesthetics such as Rancière’s (2009). We are not claiming that aesthetics 
is the final and total truth about statements such as Sue’s quoted above. But we are 
suggesting aesthetics as providing us with one truth that could be pertinent, illuminating 
hopeful routes that point beyond ‘cure’ and help us understand and care for ‘the self’ and 
‘ourselves’ in new ways. 
Materials 
One of the most fruitful approaches to studying practices of the self is the ‘memory 
work’ methodology (‘Erinnerungsarbeit’) developed first by Frigga Haug and her 
colleagues (Haug, 1987, Haug and Blankenburg 1980, Haug 1987, 2002, 2012), and later 
taken up by a number of researchers, mainly in strands of Marxist or Poststructuralist 
Feminism (e.g. Davies et al., 2001, Gillies et al., 2005, Simovska et al., 2019, Stephenson, 
2005, Widerberg, 2011). The feminist project of understanding and emancipating the self 
was conceived as an ideology critique, politicizing the private in a communal practice. 
Gendered socialization was questioned by problematizing the spontaneous ways in which 
the memory work participants constructed memories pertaining to various themes. The 
themes were considered relevant and chosen by the participants in the group, and also 
studied more widely by critical readings of for example fiction, women’s magazines, 
movies as well as psychological theory. Participants wrote short stories, which they then 
deconstructed together. The texts were thus their immediate object of study rather than the 
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person ‘as such’; they studied memories of a ‘self’ that they constructed textually and thus 
generalized as the third-person protagonist of its narrative. This seemingly ‘indirect’ 
approach to studying the self highlights the socio-material practices of self-construction 
that are often overlooked, for instance in interviews. Also, it helps to externalize and 
exoticize the forms of selfhood thus constructed, supporting the deconstructive discussions 
in memory work.  
Haug has written quite precise instructions and accounts of the experience of the 
memory work groups (Haug, 2012a). However, like many other followers, we have taken 
up these basic principles in slightly modified ways. Morten Nissen is currently using 
memory work fused with a supervision of forum theater in primary schools as an approach 
to developing teachers’ capacities, as an alternative to the forms of representation that are 
imposed with the wave of ‘visible learning’. Tine Friis is currently doing memory work in 
the exhibition space of Medical Museion, a museum for medical history and research unit 
at the University of Copenhagen. Her work addresses issues of the connection between 
our gut and psyche and investigates how we make sense of our microbial bodies and 
selves (cf. Friis, in review). 
The memory work material we discuss here was a small project in collaboration 
with counsellors from the ‘U-turn’ facility for young drug users in Copenhagen. By 2015, 
Morten had already worked with the ‘U-turn’ counsellors for almost a decade, 
rearticulating their ways of working (Nissen, 2012, 2014, 2018, Bank and Nissen, 2016, 
Nissen and Barington 2016, Nissen and Solgaard, 2017, Nissen et al., 2019). The ‘U-turn’ 
counsellors were relevant partners because the institution was founded on the paradox that 
a specialized facility for treating the disease of ‘addiction’ was considered a problematic 
and stigmatizing approach to helping young drug users, and so, the counsellors set out to 
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transform the institutional framing of their work. Memory work has much in common 
with their version of ‘narrative practice’ (White, 2007), since that included as a key trope 
the externalization and problematization of individualizing discourse such as that which 
frames ‘therapy’, ‘psychopathology’ etc.  
Morten had suggested that we worked on the theme of ‘motivation’, precisely 
because the counsellors were very skeptical about the issue and the concept. As we shall 
unfold below, their critique of ‘motivation’ was part of a historical transformation in these 
practices of the self. In their experience, the young drug users were fed up with self-
reproaches for not being sufficiently ‘motivated’. In this way, it seemed relevant for them 
to devote three of their usual Tuesday sessions (3-4 hours) to doing memory work on the 
theme. Along with his student intern Anne Rogne, Morten had presented the idea in a 
video, and the group agreed to try. Two counsellors and 7 users joined us in the 
experiment. We all wrote small texts under the heading: “One time I was motivated”. 
Then we took them one by one; the author first read aloud; then we discussed the text with 
the author silently listening; finally, the author was invited to participate in the discussion. 
We recorded and transcribed the sessions, analyzed them and discussed our ideas with 
counsellors and those users who were interested. Tine took over as intern, and her later 
master's thesis work was a large part of what we presented at conferences and published 
on a website called STUFF as a preliminary analysis2.  
Like most comparable institutions, U-turn has various ‘groups’ as part of its 
activity schedule. As is typical, this abstract concept of a ‘group’3 is often performed as a 
 
2  See (September 2020) https://www.stuffsite.org  
3  The abstractness is very characteristic (and famously rendered in Lars von Trier’s (1994) The 
Kingdom). It is seen in the use of empty names that merely denominate place such as the 
‘Vestergade group’ that participated in our memory work, or to times such as the ‘evening group’, 
‘Wednesday group’, etc. 
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gathering of counsellors with young drug users to simply ‘talk about’ problems and hopes. 
But quite often, this activity of verbal exchange transgresses standard clinical practice and 
expands into various experiments or projects with aesthetic practices: the production of 
graffiti, drawings, or (more often) poems, videos, songs or music videos. Some of the 
counsellors are also skilled musicians or artists, and in some cases, professional or semi-
professional artists and film directors have participated in creating these aesthetic 
documentations.  
The term ‘documentation’ is explained by a political struggle that began around 
the time of the establishment of U-turn in 2004. As part of the general emergence of New 
Public Management, U-turn was first required to provide standard documentation of their 
users’ drug use and other social problems to be fed into a centralized European database4 
and to prove their efficiency. This would imply standardized uptake and follow-up 
interviews with all new users. But the U-turn professionals – partly coming from a legacy 
of interactionist and systemic approaches to drug use in Copenhagen (see e.g. Nissen, 
2012 b) – argued that such ‘documentation’ was far from innocent: The soaring numbers 
of clients treated for the relatively new condition ‘cannabis dependence’ was not a 
‘natural’ epidemic, but rather a problematic cultural tendency to pathologize and 
individualize what were really social problems. In their view, the stigmatizing, degrading 
ritual of anamnesis was the last thing their users – who typically already had lots of case 
files and diagnoses to attest to their failed selves – needed. Overall, this political struggle 
was in fact relatively successful, and U-turn has become a state-recognized, yet non-
standardized ‘model’ for social work with young drug users in Denmark5 – although not 
 
4 See https://www.emcdda.europa.eu/  
5 Thus, we have studied the ‘transfer’ of the U-turn model to Elsinore, see Bank and Nissen (2017), 
Nissen and Barington (2016). 
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the most dominant or widespread model. This ‘model’ can be said to include the use of an 
alternative, aesthetic documentation, which is the production of artworks that ‘represent’ 
the young users in ways that are deemed edifying rather than stigmatizing. 
By discussing these carefully selected materials from memory work and aesthetic 
documentation, we articulate an approach to understanding the self as aesthetically 
produced and performed. By doing so, we also address related issues of ‘motivation’ and 
‘motives’ when the self is practiced, made and handled in this way. However, before 
doing so, we have to revisit the ‘para-clinical’ history related to practices of the self as this 
draws out the very issues that we seek to problematize.   
Practices of the Self: From Therapy through Motivational Interviewing … 
Psychotherapy or counseling has been an important kind of activity in which the 
self has been handled. In a certain sense, it can be seen as a staging of the self as such 
rather than in specific roles, insofar as its dialogue tends to move beyond the focus on ‘the 
self as pathological’ toward a more generalized self-reflection. In a SCHAT approach, 
though, the ‘as such’ always remains historically specific; what is going on when the self 
is staged ‘as such’ is the performance of a Modern, individualized selfhood, between 
pathology and self-actualization.  
The terms ‘staging’ and ‘performance’ are not accidental: The self is practiced in a 
way that emphasizes and works with different forms of display. Psychotherapy achieves 
its key mode of operation by its framing (Goffman, 1974), defining and delimiting itself as 
a special activity in time and space: The therapeutic space. Just by establishing that “this – 
what is going on here and now – is psychotherapy”, a projection screen is set up for the 
client to display selfhood. A radical version was Bion’s group therapy (1961) in which the 
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therapist, once the session began, would simply sit and wait for anything to happen, which 
he would then take as ‘material’ for clinical ‘interpretation’. 
The emptiness, or formalism, of this framing sets up a tension between the 
psychiatric structure of pathologies and cure for which psychotherapy is supposed to be a 
vehicle, and the joint activity of projection and interpretation that it facilitates. With this 
tension or rather contradiction, psychotherapy – as one of several activities within the 
broader fields of social work, health and education – moves toward a ‘generalization’, an 
emancipation of the client’s subjectivity and self. We propose that this can either evolve 
into a pragmatic formalism, or overcome itself to become a more substantial 
transformation of the socio-cultural issues at stake. 
We can trace the contradiction back to when Freud recognized patient utterances as 
key to the ‘talking cure’ that he hoped to develop. The clinical standards (concepts such as 
disease, disturbance, etiology, cure, crisis, and, of course, therapy) would still structure the 
practice of the therapist, while his patients’ participation was roughly limited to exposing 
themselves by delivering free associations, and learning about themselves from the 
therapist’s interpretations. But the structure of exposing and learning through dialogue 
about the self as psyche – as a new kind of thing to learn about, a new ‘epistemic object’ 
(Cetina, 2009, Miettinen & Virkkunen, 2005) –– proved the most important invention. 
The self as ‘psyche’ conceives of law/desire in scientific terms as conscious/unconscious 
rather than as virtue/sin as did the religious precursors’ notion of the self as ‘soul’ (cf. e.g. 
Taylor, 1989). 
After more than a century of increasing recognition of patients as clients, users, 
and customers – and of underlying broader categories such as women, young people, and 
mentally ill – we can appreciate the emerging contradiction between the ends (cure – of 
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the irrational, pathological subject) and the means (dialogue – with the rational, learning 
subject) of this form of practice. On the one hand, this has evolved in a ‘cunning of 
reason’ that boosted dialogue and generalized selfhood to break through the shell of 
(pseudo) medical categories. This was already prefigured in many ways in Freudian 
theory. On the other hand, this emancipation of the self led to exacerbating the asymmetry 
in the therapeutic relation itself: Why would the client submit (however temporarily) to 
the authority of the therapist if not because of some ‘disease of the self’? This would be 
addressed by reasserting and proliferating disease categories in ever new and ever more 
popularized forms6, which on the longer term undermine diagnostic authority, and by 
focusing on the formal aspects of the practice (working contract, forms of linguistic 
exchange, etc.). Despite classifying herself in the latest fashionable diagnosis, the patient-
client has now evolved into a user-customer who is no longer kept in check by the shame 
of mental illness or deviance. As a result, what legitimizes psychotherapy is the 
specialized staging of self (through the projection screen of the therapeutic space), and 
client retention is becoming a prime measure of success. Metaphorically, therapy is 
reduced to customers having conversations with salespersons who have nothing to sell 
apart from that conversation itself and the ways that this very emptiness works as a mirror; 
what matters most is to keep the customer in the shop (cf. Nissen and Barington, 2016). 
However, this ‘endpoint’ is rarely if ever reached as such. More commonly, it 
keeps presenting itself anew in opposition to clinical paternalism, thus promising to 
paradoxically unite ‘cure’ with emancipation from its own institutional and discursive 
underpinnings. 
 
6  Psychiatric disease categories move toward (more visibly) becoming ‘boundary objects’ that 
accommodate lay perspectives by substituting purely empirical definitions for ‘etiological’, that 
is, those derived from the expert knowledge and explanations of the professionals (cf. Bowker 
and Star, 1999, Hacking, 1998). 
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This contradiction is at play in a range of contemporary therapies that claim to 
base on client recognition. As an example, the widespread ‘Motivational Interviewing’ - 
MI (cf. Miller and Rollnick, 2013) is prototypical in its pragmatic fusion of ‘client-
centered’ and ‘cognitive-behavioral’ approaches. One reason for MI’s spectacular global 
success (Björk, 2014) is the way it addresses the problem of motivation. Motivation was 
traditionally seen as a relatively secondary precondition for therapy, but it came to the fore 
as therapy evolved as something clients chose rather than had to do. MI provides a 
technique for handling unmotivated clients: accepting and mapping clients’ motives as 
they state them, the therapist aligns the motives on a linear dimension of ‘change’ (e.g. as 
the pros and cons of quitting drugs), while especially prompting elaborations of motives 
pro ‘change’. In MI, then, we have the general contradiction between the clinical 
normativity of ‘change’ and the ‘emancipatory’, liberal recognition of any client 
reasoning. An obvious critique could target this as a shallow liberalism, by revealing 
either the normativity (barely) hidden behind a liberal appearance, or conversely, it could 
reproach the normativity of that neo-liberalism itself, as the coercion to self-control (Rose, 
1999). But, without refuting this form of critique, we might gain more from studying MI 
closer as a form of activity. For this, we can learn from the linguistic anthropology of Carr 
and Smith (Carr, 2013, Carr and Smith, 2014). 
First, the pragmatics of MI (which is very far from pragmatism). MI’s liberal face 
is conceptualized on the side of the therapist as an evidence-based anti-metaphysics 
(Björk, 2014). It is pragmatic because it is legitimized by ‘what works’ rather than by 
‘what is true’. ‘What works’ is independent of the substantial nature of the goal, and for 
that reason the goal is conceptualized abstractly (as ‘change’ of ’behavior’). Accordingly, 
the client is free to contemplate herself as she pleases. There is no truth to be arrived at 
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and enunciated7, and this leaves any meta-reflection of MI as activity in a void. 
Apparently, it ‘works’ to ignore the question: Am I motivated for MI? This kind of meta-
motivation is achieved by simply responding to the question with MI, or in other words, 
by collapsing meta-reflection into the practice itself. This is MI’s way of performing the 
ignorance of inter-subjectivity, which is characteristic of mainstream psychology, even as 
it provides a technology of dialogue (Nissen, 2020). 
But, secondly, this pragmatics opens to a linguistic creativity, or what Carr and 
Smith call a ‘poetics of practice’. In their analysis, MI works by cultivating performative 
speech acts that come to shape clients’ beliefs and reflections. It is rendered as a 
“distinctly behavioral thesis” (Carr and Smith, 2014, p. 90) in MI (although with a 
somewhat Wittgensteinian flavor) “that people tend to believe what they hear themselves 
say” (Miller and Rollnick, 2013, p. 195). A main point is that MI has thus overcome the 
opposition between ‘directiveness’ and ‘client-centeredness’: 
Our analysis shows that the very hallmark of MI is borne of the disaggregation of the semantics and 
poetics of the therapeutic text, so that the referential and metalingual function of the therapeutic 
message can be purposed to the ends of ‘client-centeredness’, while the same message is stylized to 
direct clients as well (Carr and Smith, 2014, p. 107). 
For example, lengthy pauses within therapists’ conversation turns seem to index 
thoughtful doubt and openness, while at the same time they work to ‘hold the floor’ and 
direct attention to what comes after (e.g. as ‘cliffhangers’). While the ‘client-centered’ 
semantics are explicitly announced in MI, the ‘directive’ poetics are, however, trained and 
learnt by the therapist through imitation and practicing. The latter must remain tacit, Car 
 
7  With Foucault, we could say that the telos of this technology of the self is (or appears to be) 
detached from any commitment to a communal moral framework – and in interestingly 
problematic ways (cf. Foucault, 1985). 
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and Smith suggest, both because it is an art, and because it seems opposed to what they 
describe as an (allegedly, American) ideal of ‘authenticity’ when explicated. 
Carr and Smith reproduce and confirm MI’s pragmatics by simply delegating to 
other sciences the question of content. The manipulative nature of MI poetics is deemed 
unimportant, or it is rendered as only problematic when seen from the point of view of an 
essentialist ideology of ‘authenticity’. We would argue, against this, that MI poetics can 
and should be critically rearticulated with a quite different concept of authenticity – such 
as the one articulated by Charles Taylor (1991). This is authenticity as credible and 
edifying socio-cultural constructions of selfhood. These are indeed characterized by 
broadly aesthetic qualities, as Carr and Smith suggest, but not simply (and pragmatically) 
as style, as ‘the how’, or the way of fashioning utterances. Rather, ‘authentic’ aesthetics is 
the creation of artifacts that facilitate a reconfiguring of sense and meaning and thus 
‘touch and move’ (see Høgsbro and Nissen, 2014). Following this track, as we shall do 
below, ‘disaggregation’ – or, in the terms of Jacques Rancière’s (2009) aesthetics, dis-
sensus – can indeed be noted as a key element. Thus, the carefully crafted ‘poetics’ of MI 
(as of other therapeutic traditions) may under certain circumstances render the core 
contradiction in psychotherapy in productive and transformative ways. Or, to be more 
precise, the contradiction may become productive and transformative if that rendering 
addresses the contradictory circumstances of psychotherapy – and in that sense, breaks 
with the dogma of pragmatics even if that dogma is what promises commercial success 
and client retention. Below, we will unfold this point by discussing U-turn’s practice of 
aesthetic documentation. 
… to Aesthetic Documentation 
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The movement of psychotherapy toward pragmatics and an applied linguistic 
‘poetics of practice’ is very visible in the field of addiction counseling. MI is one of two 
dominant approaches – the other is the family of 12 steps fellowships and derived 
professional methods. At U-turn, however, other traditions are paramount, such as 
Solution-Focused Brief Therapy (De Shazer & Dolan, 2012) and Narrative Therapy 
(White, 2007). These describe themselves in ways much closer to Carr and Smith’s own 
terms, and much further from what these authors claim is the American ideal of 
authenticity. The other traditions are interesting references because with them, therapists 
explicitly draw on a wider range of social theory and philosophy – e.g. Bruner, 
Wittgenstein, Foucault, Derrida – to reflect what they do as language games and 
narratives. Moreover, they attempt to frame their practices as no longer structured by the 
stigmatizing clinical standard. 
The main question, however, is whether these language games and narratives 
perform the formalism of a pragmatic psychotherapy, or whether in fact they address and 
transform social circumstances that are problematic because they make it tempting to do 
‘therapy’. We have discussed this question with the counsellors at U-turn in numerous 
forms and instances as this question is also the specific contribution of SCHAT as a kind 
of critical psychology. SCHAT is not the only theoretical approach that would point to 
material and political, socio-cultural conditions underlying framings, narratives and 
discourses as practices. But, coming from SCHAT, we are inclined to appreciate that this 
awareness is present also in Goffman, Foucault, Derrida, Wittgenstein, Bruner etc. – even 
if it is not often highlighted in the readings of those theorists as presented by some of the 
main protagonists of those therapies (e.g. de Shazer) that partly survive as cultural forms 
because they can be also read as pragmatic. In particular, the tradition of ‘narrative 
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practice’ is situated at that junction (witnessed also by the references to Vygotsky in its 
canonical literature such as White (2007). 
As mentioned above, the counsellors at U-turn have developed a practice of 
aesthetic documentation that expands narrative practice into, at certain times, a full-blown 
practice of creating aesthetic artefacts. What difference does that make?  
In a first approximation, we can point to the objectification that takes place with 
the artworks. The title for U-turn’s Give a Story project, for instance, was no coincidence. 
One of the videos8 in this project gives away Sebastian’s ‘story’ to his family and friends, 
to staff and users at U-turn, to other professionals, to us researchers, and to the unlimited 
audience of the internet. This ‘giving away’ is achieved with the materiality of the video. 
It is a recognition of Sebastian’s motives and feelings in a context that is quite different 
from that of diagnosing dependency. The constraints of that materiality, and the goal of 
that recognition, in turn, were what required the production team to work on Sebastian’s 
story as an artifact, to dwell on its qualities and possible meanings and implications. In 
Ilyenkov’s term (1977), the video objectified certain aspects of (our ways of approaching) 
Sebastian’s situation as an ‘ideal artifact’. It amplified the socio-cultural mediation of his 
self as something to be reworked critically, and something that was neither to be taken for 
granted, nor to be trusted to a clinical profession as the signs of a pathology or a cure. 
With the distinction that Vygotsky took up from Frege, Sebastian’s experience was taken 
seriously and developed from sense to meaning, from merely sensed to also meaningful – 
that is, the making of sense was objectified and generalized. 
This potential of art was already noted in Vygotsky’s psychology of art: 
 
8  See (September 2020)  http://player.vimeo.com/video/98728123  
Recognizing Motives: The Dissensual Self   •   104 
OUTLINES – CRITICAL PRACTICE STUDIES • Vol. 21, No. 2 • 2020 
www.outlines.dk 
The melting of feelings outside us is performed by the strength of social feeling, which is 
objectivized, materialized, and projected outside of us, then fixed in external objects of art, which 
have become the tools of society. Art is the social technique of emotion, a tool of society which 
brings the most intimate and personal aspects of our being into the circle of social life (Vygotsky, 
1974, p. 78). 
An old idea, then. But for this to take place in the practice of aesthetic 
documentation, a century later, two cultural developments must have occurred, both of 
which are facilitated and prompted greatly by the recent revolution of media and 
information technologies. For one thing, the public/private division is changing, so that 
people tend to make public much of what was once reserved for the private sphere, or at 
least they construct parts of their front-stage selves (Goffman, 1956) by ‘coming out’ and 
‘giving away’ versions of what is presented as back-stage selves (Illouz, 2003). Not least, 
‘shameful’ conditions of suffering or deviance are now often publicized in specific claims 
for recognition; and many figures of the contemporary ‘art scene’ are prominent in this 
tendency – along with the ‘auto-fiction’ trend in literature. For another, there have been 
persistent attempts in the art world to break down the art/life distinction (e.g. situationism, 
socialist realism, pop art, etc.). According to Boris Groys (2016), these have been much 
accentuated by the involvement of the masses, not only (as in the 20th century) in 
consumption, but now also in the production of artworks, as is now technically possible. 
Thus, we can no longer dismiss such artworks as Sebastian’s as amateur self-expressions 
used as tools for a private therapeutic process. They are objectified, brought into the circle 
of social life. 
This ‘objectivity’ of the artwork is much strengthened also by its simultaneous 
place in U-turn’s ongoing experiments with counseling, and thus in research, and in 
political struggles. This could lead to the worry that such ‘external’ concerns might 
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undermine its aesthetic qualities; ‘l’art pour l’art’ (art for the sake of art) could be 
degenerated to kitch instrumentalized in propaganda. That dichotomy is unsatisfying (cf. 
Groys, 2008), but in fact, one obvious pitfall is to substitute the thin narrative of a positive 
psychology for the expected classic stigma. 
Figure 1 
U -turn: Give a Story – Sebastian. Reprinted with permission 
 
Note. Sebastian relating his story in a video 
But this suspicion is dispelled once we take a closer look at Sebastian’s video. After 
a black screen with the words (in Danish, that translate as:) “To Louis and Frey / to fire 
and smoke / in a sea of people”, we see him close up, a young man with a beard and a cap, 
pocketing his smartphone and, with a shy smile, putting on his headphones, then singing 
‘karaoke’ along with what he (alone) hears (in English): “I was fine / I pulled myself 
together / just in time / to throw myself away”. His trembling voice fills the audio, except 
we can also hear the muted beats of a lively street festival visibly going on around him. 
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“Now I can’t think / who I was before / You ruined everything / in the nicest way”, he 
ends.   
The story Sebastian gives us is far from simple. In fact, it is not even easily 
classified as a ‘story’. But the tensions between his timid voice and his courage facing us 
with it, the privacy of the commercially published song he hears and sings9, in a foreign 
language, lonely in a crowd dancing to other tunes and rhythms, are palpable and inviting. 
The meaning created does not replace and annul sense; it reconfigures it, even reawakens 
it as open questions to what we thought it meant. 
The U-turn counsellors have taken inspiration from Nicolas Bourriaud’s ‘relational 
aesthetics’ (2002) that emphasize the social aspects of the artwork’s “proposal of a shared 
world” of sense (ibid, p. 9). If meaning is brought back to, and perhaps disturbed by, the 
sensual, then this sense is relational, so that the sense Sebastian makes of his world is 
made common, his idiosyncrasy partly overcome. Yet what emerges is not ‘common 
sense’. Far from it, community is proposed anew precisely by dissociating the sense we 
expected to make of it.  
If we want to recognize Sebastian’s story, Bourriaud’s focus on creating 
community can thus be expanded by Rancière’s (2009) theory of aesthetics as dissensus. 
For Rancière, crafting dissensus is to “stage a conflict between two regimes of sense” 
(Rancière, 2009, p. 128). 
The uncommon sense of the young client turned into an artist quoting lyrics, 
dedicating his work to named people unknown to us and then to “fire and smoke” (is that 
cannabis?), is like a Brechtian estrangement (Verfremdung). It allows us to meet Sebastian 
in other ways than with the sensual registers suggested by the structures of meaning that 
 
9  Jonathan Coulton: You ruined everything, 2006  
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we unknowingly had in common. For a start, the young social misfit, whom perhaps we 
imagined as lacking in knowledge, taste, and motivation, meets us eye to eye; instead of 
planning how to educate or activate him, we are encouraged to assume what Rancière calls 
an ‘equality of intelligence’, of curiosity and search for poetry and beauty. To Rancière, a 
key aspect of the modern ‘aesthetic regime’ is this kind of dissensus, this clash of different 
‘regimes of sense’, which 
...means that every situation can be cracked open from the inside, reconfigured in a different regime 
of perception and signification. To reconfigure the landscape of what can be seen and what can be 
thought is to alter the field of the possible and the distributions of capacities and incapacities 
(Rancière, 2009, p. 60). 
Far from reduced to an instrument of predefined politics or ethics, or simply 
resting in an unconnected sphere of art for art’s sake, the artwork contributes to their 
reorientation.  
Thus, we can note how Sebastian’s video re-articulates public space. Within the 
video, the spaces of the headphones, the close-up, and the street festival make us aware of 
spatial boundaries. Zooming out, the public space of the municipal facility, and its 
website, are turned into liminal spaces of complex becoming and social transformation 
(Turner, 1969, Greco and Stenner, 2017, Stenner, 2018). We are encouraged to ask: can 
the welfare state transform from a domain of expertise in pathology into an agora of re-
identification with, and of, social problems? (see also Bank and Nissen, 2017). This is 
precisely what might mark a difference to the New Public Management vision of 
overcoming paternalism through consumer choice, which fits smoothly with pragmatic 
versions of counseling. 
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The concept of dissensus comes from Rancière, but it has a history also in 
SCHAT. In his psychology of art, Vygotsky (1974) worked to re-articulate the 
Aristotelian theory of catharsis into his emerging theory of activity:  
A work of art (such as a fable, a short story, a tragedy), always includes an affective contradiction, 
causes conflicting feelings, and leads to the short-circuiting and destruction of these emotions. This 
is the true effect of a work of art. (...) Aesthetic reaction as such is nothing but catharsis, that is, a 
complex transformation of feelings (Vygotsky, 1974, p. 69). 
Vygotsky’s take on catharsis, however, does not imply a harmonious conclusion or 
synthesis. Great art, such as Shakespeare’s Hamlet, which Vygotsky analyzes in the 
quoted work, does not restore an easy common sense. Rather, that “complex 
transformation of feelings,” as a “social technique of emotion” (Vygotsky, 1974, p. 78), is 
a construction of paradoxes that is eminently political. When we read Vygotsky thus as an 
earlier version of Brecht’s estrangement and Rancière’s dissensus, his revolutionary social 
engineering – implied in his ‘experimental-genetic method’ of studying the higher mental 
functions by creating them – is restored, but also democratized10. Artists such as 
Shakespeare or Sebastian (and his counsellors) do push issues and open questions, but 
they do not know in advance how feelings should and will be shaped or what to make of it 
when we are touched and moved by their art. Rather, they ‘know with us’, just-in-time, as 
we contemplate the shared but dissensual world of the artwork together. 
This shared and complex world is touching, here and now, but also moving (cf. 
Høgsbro and Nissen, 2014). Without subsuming perceptions and affects as functions to a 
program or a future state of affairs claimed to derive from God or Science, art anticipates, 
it shapes fears and hopes by creating and demonstrating them as prototypes, or, with Ernst 
 
10 This reading is similar to Jameson’s (1998) affirmative reading of Brecht’s ‘Lehrtheater’ as 
opposed to the doctrinarian pedagogics that Rancière (2014), with good reason, criticizes. 
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Bloch (1995), as real possibilities, concrete utopias. The video shows us in glimpses how 
Sebastian can be, and how we can relate to him. It imagines what can lie beyond our 
present life, not by authority, but by authoring, by inscribing hopes into the sensuous yet 
transcendent presence of ideal artifacts. Or, again with Vygotsky: 
Art is the organization of our future behavior. It is a requirement that may never be fulfilled but that 
forces us to strive beyond our life toward all that lies beyond it (Vygotsky, 1974, p. 81). 
The Art of Overcoming Therapy 
 How does our analysis of Sebastian’s video, then, relate to the “social techniques of 
the self”, which we have traced in the history of psychotherapy? To demonstrate this, we 
will return to the question of how art and aesthetics are more than just a style of doing 
therapy and illustrate this by drawing in material from our previously mentioned memory 
work on motivation in relation to aesthetic documentation. 
 At first, taking off from Sue’s initially quoted statement about her motives, we 
might wonder whatever happened to affect or emotion in psychotherapy. The project of 
verbally rationalizing and normalizing affect seems to unite currently hegemonic 
cognitivist pragmatics, not only with its psychoanalytic ancestors, but also with its 
contemporary narrative and solution-focused opponents11. As we discussed above, today’s 
client-centeredness seems aligned with a manipulative directiveness articulated either with 
a pragmatics of effect or with a seemingly radical constructionist idea of shaping motives 
by naming them (as in solution-focused therapy). In either case, the disturbing, 
disconcerting, or emancipating ways in which affect points beyond the projection screen 
of the therapeutic space are ignored. This indicates the limitations of psychotherapy as 
 
11 A study of the inverse tradition, prominently psycho-drama and the Gestalt therapy of Perls and 
his successors, from the point of view of SCHAT – but beyond the mere identification of the 
obvious shortcomings of their notion of emotional release – would be an interesting future project, 
since Gestalt in so many ways is directly complementary to Narrative therapy. 
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such. Neither clinical paternalism nor the more recent pragmatic formalism can harness 
the potentials of art as a ‘social technique of emotions’, since these potentials are 
indissociable from its dissensus and its radical assumption of equality (Rancière, 2009). At 
the end of the day, recognizing emotions is like all other kinds of recognition (Taylor, 
1995): A humanism that cultivates others only by also cultivating ourselves. In order to do 
this, we must, in other words, overcome the standard of psychotherapy as a tool for 
reflecting and organizing practice. 
 Dissensus implies breaking with any assumption of identity between an utterance, 
its motive, and its (emotional) impact on the receiver. The reflexivity performed with the 
projection screen of the counselling activity itself is in fact never fully understandable in 
diagnostic terms, neither as directive or client-centered. These conceptualizations are 
straightjackets. The problem is not so much whether reflection is accurate; rather, it is 
what comes of it – and what comes of it is never just cure, nor just the private self-
reflection of a customer.  
 Allow us to illustrate our point further with another artwork. In Louise Bourgeois’ 
installation “In and Out” depicted here below12, even a ‘cell’ full of mirrors can do little 
more about hysteria than name it (and thus cage it). Meanwhile, life seems to escape, to 
flow and grow as the absurd alien pink substance outside the cage.  
Figure 2 
A woman is looks at artwork 
 
12 This image was purchased by the author from https://www.gettyimages.dk/detail/news-
photo/woman-is-looks-at-artwork-room-9-in-and-out-at-the-louise-news-photo/464483822   
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Note: Munich, Germany – February 26: A woman is looks at artwork 'Room 9 In and Out' 
(1995) at the 'Louise Bourgeois. Strukturen des Daseins: Die Zellen' exhibition preview at 
Haus der Kunst on February 26, 2015 in Munich, Germany. (Photo by Joerg Koch/Getty 
Images) 
 In this way, performing the self mediated by aesthetic documentation is recreating 
and developing it – not just caging, picturing, curing or manipulating it. Returning to the 
activity of talking about one’s motives, it becomes relevant to examine what happens if we 
impose the standard of aesthetic documentation rather than the standard of psychotherapy. 
In other words, if we take that activity as a ‘ready-made’ that becomes a work of art by 
being framed as such ‘at an exhibition’, like Duchamp’s famous pissoir named 
“Fountain”13. 
 
13 Whether or not that was really the work of Elsa Von Freytag-Loringhoven, as recently claimed 
by, among others, Siri Hustvedt. 
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 For one thing, it would help us appreciate art in forms that appear sometimes 
unnoticed in everyday life. Thus, in the memory work session prior to the one quoted in 
the beginning of our text, Eric recapitulates Morten’s initial explanation about our 
research theme, motivation: 
Okay. An example: So, Trine (counsellor) asked me this same thing, and then she went on to ask 
directly, too: “What might motivate you to stop smoking grass?” And my answer was this: “We-ell, 
a trip to Africa wouldn’t be too bad!” (laughter). 
 Learning from (among others) Paul Willis (2001), we can regard Eric’s joke as a 
work of art. The joke has specific genre conventions that we all recognize and which Eric 
uses in a visibly stylized way in order to create a paradox. The counsellor’s client-centered 
talk of ‘motivation’ is deconstructed by Eric’s absurd exaggeration, yet precisely this 
presents us with the ‘blues hope’ utopia (Mattingly, 2010) of a ‘change’ that would be 
radical enough to actually help him form new motives. Sadly, it is this deep truth that is 
absurd enough for us to laugh about. 
 Similarly, we can return to Sue’s statement: 
But I guess, too, I sometimes experience, that, when I’m doing/feeling as bad as I can ever possibly 
get … then I get, like, even more motivated that, “why, I can get even worse!” You know – sometimes 
when everything is going to hell, I think: “You know what? Fuck that!”  
 This is not so easily recognized as art. But we can begin by assuming (with Rancière) 
an equality of intelligence in this ‘poetics of practice’. Sue has not attended MI training, but 
she has trained in verbal self-report most of her life (cf. Billig, 1999); she seems able to 
deploy that feigned uncertainty, the within-turn pauses, and the cliff-hanger effect that Carr 
and Smith identify, just the same. And she does accomplish a ‘complex transformation of 
feeling’: We are baffled by her dissensus, by the way that what she says does not make sense 
at all, yet is immediately recognizable, sensuously felt as a credible expression. She seems 
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to insist that ‘we know’ how it feels to address one’s sensible self aggressively. But do we? 
The assumption that we would know is built into the framing of this ‘group session’ long 
before she mocks it to make us doubt it, to make us question what it is we feel when we 
identify. Moreover, even if the ensuing conversation proceeded to suggest various reasons 
for such self-harm to be after all reasonable – e.g. ‘she gains control of her misery’ – these 
attempts capitulate in the face of the glaring contradiction that forces us to paradoxically 
recognize Sue’s self-cancellation as reasonable subject. Her utterance insists on pointing to 
the limits of this whole project of self-learning, by metaphorically crafting the ‘absurd alien 
substance’ of her ugly motive that takes shape outside it.  
 But are Sue’s motives and feelings objectified into socially recognized artworks? 
This question is crucial for any reflection of art that does not wish to achieve its universality 
at the price of dissolving it (cf. Groys, 2008). In the example with Eric’s joke, we can still 
point to his orchestration of a special event using genre conventions that we share – thus, to 
‘ritualized’ aspects of practice that may be unnoticed, but which serve to objectify the joke 
nonetheless. At the very least, our laughing recognizes Eric’s utterance as a joke, no matter 
how routinely. 
 With Sue’s utterance, it seems less obvious. But this may be because it is even closer 
to us. The objectification and recognition of her utterance is in fact going on right here, in 
this very text. More generally, it takes place in the infrastructure of artifacts and 
communities Sue entered  when she participated in the memory work sessions, and which 
we enter by writing and reading this. The performativity of our research is realized as we, 
mediated by artifacts such as this text, engage in the politics of those infrastructures.  
 In Louise Bourgeois’ work, our own non-reciprocated gaze into that porous space of 
the cage is perhaps what is most troubling; is this, our complicity, what she helps us see? 
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We might compare this to the tradition in psychotherapy of recording sessions for training 
purposes, that is, for audiences into which clients are never invited. Such redcordings seem 
directly continuous with the practice of displaying patients with pathologies in psychiatry 
lectures that was common until the middle 20th century. 
 But in the systemic-constructionist and narrative traditions, these recordings can be 
said to emphasize and actualize (rather than invent or create) the general structure of 
professional objectification into which sessions are inscribed. In this way, they have actually 
helped problematize this asymmetry by encouraging therapists’ self-reflection. In ‘narrative 
practice’, this movement toward equality is furthered by the practice of orchestrating 
‘outsider witnessing’, by poetic recapitulation, and by various methods of inscription such 
as writing on whiteboards of which clients take snapshots with their smartphones, writing 
letters to clients, using those letters as institutional case files etc. (Bank and Nissen, 2017, 
Nissen and Barington, 2016). The counsellors at U-turn have worked in many ways with 
such ‘recognition’ of what clients say by recording, objectifying, modelling, recreating it, 
including as artworks. As an example, the first version of Sebastian’s Give a Story video 
was when he, in a group session, overwhelmed everyone by suddenly standing up and 
singing those lines. This event inspired the subsequent creation of his art video.  
 In that sense, our imposition of the standard of aesthetic documentation is itself 
performed as artwork, in that it recreates Sue’s utterance as a dissensual artifact. From this 
point of view, we can hypothesize that Sue’s words were never intended as a clear and 
unequivocal statement of motive. Rather, perhaps, it was the motif of ambivalence in regard 
to taking care of herself, which, with this statement and with its inscription here, was given 
a form. Our text then becomes what we call a catalogue text; a text that achieves its purposes 
in a dialogic relation to artworks, a relation of mutual recognition and co-construction. At 
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the same time, it troubles the neat distinction between art and theory because it cannot but 
create metaphorical double entendre even as it attempts to deconstruct or reflect 
contradictions14. 
Finally: Death strolls between letters...  
 But watch out! There is one ‘ugly pink substance’ that seems about to escape from 
the cage of mirrors into which we have attempted to lock us up in this text. We may be 
recognizing Sue as an artist, but how do we grasp her self-destructive ‘motivation’ for 
‘getting even worse’? Have we overcome therapy to the extent that we are now happy with 
poetic renderings of self-destruction, with such marvelous artistic sacrifices as those of Jim 
Morrison, Kurt Cobain, or Amy Winehouse in the back of our minds? We hope not. 
Overcoming is sublating, superseding, not simply substituting. Aesthetic documentation is 
still committed to human growth and flourishing, to expanding agency, even if it does not 
take the form of ‘cure’; and so must we be, with our performative texts that rearticulate it. 
We might take solace in the idea that Louise Bourgeois and many other artists probably 
nourished from their aesthetic work; but we would not truly recognize Sue’s utterance if we 
were only to take it seriously with the shudder of an art consumer. More generally, 
Rancière’s concept of dissensus is unhelpful if it is simply read negatively, as a refusal of 
any positive ethics; rather, it is part of a political philosophy (Rancière, 1999) that can be 
said to rely on and unfold an ethics of expanding agency as communal production and 
control of our forms and conditions of life15. 
 
14 This idea is developed from Boris Groys’ (2008; 2016) analysis of the mutual infusion of theory 
and art, as well as Rancière’s notion of a ‘poetics of knowledge’.  
15 This way of rendering an ethics of agency – or action potence – was developed in the German-
Scandinavian branch of SCHAT and critical psychology, cf. Osterkamp (1976). 
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 But recognizing Sue’s motive requires that we recognize the motif of ambivalence 
toward her self. This implies that we must move beyond the functionalist presuppositions 
on which the concept of motivation is typically premised, even in its SCHAT versions (cf. 
Nissen, 2019).  
 We should perhaps warn the reader, at this point, that such a move beyond the 
presuppositions of functionalist realism that typically frame psychological articles on 
motivation expands the range of concepts and the complexity of the argument.  
 At the memory work sessions, we overstepped the boundaries of ‘motivation’ a 
number of times. Thus, Lucy had written her text under her (slightly altered) headline “I 
was once motivated”. It began like this: 
Today, I am not sure what motivation is.  
It’s a lie.  
Today, motivation feels like emptiness. It is gone.  
Or, not quite. I am motivated for other things  
A healthy lifestyle w. exercise and good food 
Going out to get fresh air 
To quit smoking 
Putting structure to my life 
Remembering to be myself and “do-me” 
Taking care of my family 
That people are happy and feel comfortable 
To gain respect for myself 
To breathe  
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How can you be motivated to move on if you can’t stand the place you are at now?  
 Lucy’s initial despair seems released by a list of motivations as “other things”, a list 
that moves in the general discourse of lifestyle and self-improvement. But the lists ends with 
a bridge: In the ensuing discussion, Lucy first explains that “To breathe” is about 
remembering to inhale deeply rather than hyperventilate, as a physio-therapist has taught 
her; but, as it turns out eventually, it has a double sense. It also means to live. Lucy is still, 
two years after her brother’s death by heroin overdose, not sure that she wants to live. This 
is why the paradox of the following final line makes sense.  
 Lucy had taken us beyond those ”other things” that we are busy with while life 
happens to us (to paraphrase John Lennon). Outside of, and prefiguring, the rational 
standards of motives structured as ends and means, there is life as opposed to death. It did 
not surprise us much, then, that Lucy would secund Sue’s initially quoted “Fuck that!”-
utterance thus: 
Lucy: That’s where I’m at, too 
Sue: Yeah? 
Lucy: When I, when I am already half-way into disaster, then I might as well… 
Sue: Then I might as well push it all the way to where it no longer holds, like… 
Lucy: Out where one thinks, “okay, that was...” (laughs) 
Sue: Precisely 
Lucy Yes. Then you might as well.... really, you know… now we’re living! Like ... 
 “Now we’re living!” connotes to the concept of ‘bare life’ (Agamben, 1998); the 
reduction to mere survival is what highlights ‘life’, as opposed to ‘death’. This almost a 
vitalist move is a strong way of problematizing ‘motivation’, and it seems to also pose a 
problem to any articulation based on a theory of practice or activity.  
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 We can find the same problem in Schüll’s (2012) wonderful ethnography of machine 
gambling in Las Vegas. Schüll finds circuits of control that encompass socio-technical 
arrangements, including both the gambling machines now psychologically designed, 
optimized for ‘keeping the customer in the shop’, and the Gamblers Anonymous sessions. 
The gamblers are often both providers and users in both places. These circuits are upheld 
by strong forces, including economic interest, but also by a paradoxical desire of the 
gamblers to be and to remain in a ‘zone’ of non-subjectivity, free of any responsibility, 
choice or action. Characteristically, Schüll looks to Freud’s ‘death drive’ for analytic 
resource; and, just as expectedly, that leads to little more than a way of naming the issue 
(not unlike Louise Bourgeois’ strange pink substance). Freud’s wish to overcome clinical 
functionalism should certainly be acknowledged, but we may hope to do more than repeat 
such an abstract negation. 
 In our dialogues with U-turn, we have suggested a way to move it further that is 
informed by philosophies of the self that highlight moments of self-overcoming. This 
approach takes the self to be – in Søren Kierkegaard’s words –  
...a derived, constituted, relation (...) a relation which relates itself to its own self, and in relating itself 
to its own self relates itself to another. (...) The self cannot of itself attain and remain in equilibrium 
and rest by itself, but only by relating itself to that Power which constituted the whole relation 
(Kierkegaard, 1980, p. 14). 
 We propose, though, to remain atheists and take Kierkegaard’s “Power” (a.k.a. God) 
to be an alienated rendering of human community – like Bateson does in his famous analysis 
of the ‘Higher Power’ of Alcoholics Anonymous, with reference to Durkheim (Bateson, 
1972). But let us remain respectful, too. As such, it is more than simply a way of stating the 
general socio-cultural mediatedness and contextuality of the self. This takes us beyond the 
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reach of most of the SCHAT tradition (cf. Nissen, 2012 a, 2013 a). The subject is constituted 
in reciprocal (but not symmetrical) power relations, relations of recognition. When selves 
are performed, they are not only constructed (as if by some preexisting constructing meta-
subjective agency of the individual), but continuously re-constituted in these relations16.   
 As it is mythically represented by Kierkegaard – and retained in Althusser’s concept 
of interpellation (1994), even if not in most receptions of it – it is the singular or individual 
collective, which recognizes the equally singular person as subject. 
However, in contrast to the idea of God, the collective is itself not something pre-given, 
but co-constituted. It is the simultaneous individuation of the person and the collective (cf. 
Simondon, 1989). As it is clearly visible in the relations between the (democratic nation) 
state and its citizen-subjects, I’s and We’s constitute each other continuously (cf. also 
Stiegler, 2010). This implies transcendence. In the moment of constitution, we must refer 
beyond ourselves for the meaning with which ‘we’ can make sense. We always constitute 
ourselves on a horizon of hope, as an “imagined” or “coming community” (Nissen, 2012 a, 
Anderson, 1991, Agamben, 1993, Esposito, 2010, Mattingly, 2010, Bloch, 1995)17. Finally, 
it implies submission: At the moment of reconstitution, the agent-subject is subjected, 
surrenders her self to the Other, to the collective that is in the same moment reconstituted. 
The self that she surrenders is, at this moment, stripped of her agency, exposing the ‘bare 
life’ of human being. 
 
16 These processes of constitution are key to a practice-based reinterpretation of much of the 
mystery of the unconscious, the oedipal conflicts, etc., as the best contemporary readings of 
psychoanalysis confirm, e.g. Balibar, 2017, Stiegler, 2010; Zizek, 1999. 
17 “Community” is the right term here, rather than “collective”, not only with reference to these 
theories, but also because it is proto-collective, not yet constituted. 
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This ‘passive’ aspect of subjectivity has not been easy to integrate into SCHAT, perhaps 
because it has been articulated so much with religious and psychoanalytic mythology, and 
appears antithetical to agency. It is here that we must keep in mind the dialectical legacy 
that connects us through Hegel with Kierkegaard, Mead, Kojève, Lacan, Derrida, and 
others. Not least, it is indispensable when we approach the issue of addiction, for many 
reasons, including the world-wide prominence of the 12 step fellowships, which, directly 
opposing pragmatic psychotherapy, emphasize submission as the ‘cure of the self’ (Keis, 
Nielsen and Nissen, 2016).  
On this background, Sue’s and Lucy’s invocation of self-destruction can be articulated as 
aesthetic invitations to reconstitution by and of emergent collectives. In common sense 
words, these are cries for help and care – but precisely cries for help and care that are 
radically different from those which we know about in our common sense. This difference 
is crucial. It is at first an abstract negation of common sense as they construct a ‘liminal 
zone’, a zone of indecision, of ambiguity (cf. Stenner, 2016, 2018). Is this ‘zone’, like the 
gamblers’ zone in Schüll’s (2012) description, an antechamber to death? Perhaps it is! Or, 
perhaps it is a ‘zone’ of metamorphosis, of a ‘blues hope’ of rebirth, indeed of a ‘proximal 
development’ that is not to be domesticated into a linear developmental teleology by a 
‘know-it-all’ schoolmaster.  
Note, however, that this reading of liminality is dialectical: It does not reduce the indecision 
of the zone to a mere hybridity, but engages with its contradiction. The pivotal moment that 
frames the zone can only be grasped in a normative and performative approach that itself 
co-constructs the hopes of reconstitution. The recognition of the art in Sue’s and Lucy’s 
utterances that took place in many ways at U-turn, and takes place here in this text, can only 
include a recognition of the dramatic and real possibility of death by also invoking the ‘we’ 
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who interpellates them as participants in projects that negate the present situation by 
unfolding life as more than mere survival (see also Nissen, 2013 a, 2014). 
The most disturbing lesson to be had from Sue’s and Lucy’s self-destructive zones reminds 
us that dialectics should not be reduced to the consolation of a messianic teleology in which 
we can, after all, endow them with function. That would be just the kind of ‘functionalistic 
dialectics’ that Derrida, Ranciere and others (including many Vygotskians) struggle to 
overcome. Rather, dialectics is ‘just in time’ (Jensen, 1999). It emerges here with us. It may 
be that the liminal zone is later to be reconstructed as a germ cell, a zone of proximal 
development, but first we must live up to the reality, the drama, of indecision. In order to 
do this, it is not sufficient to simply invoke an abstract notion of temporality or process. At 
the heart of a cultural-historical approach lies a dialectics that recognizes paradox and 
contradiction as constitutive also of the artifacts with which we deal with such moments and 
processes, when they are long passed or repeated – the text in which they become theory 
and the works in which we see them as art. When we recognize and co-construct Sue’s and 
Lucy’s texts and utterances as works of art – with this and other catalogue texts – the 
paradoxes and ambiguities they perform are recreated. Any interesting work of art would 
create dissensus, a clash of senses. And any truly relevant analysis would reconstruct them 
with theoretical concepts that are themselves evolving in contradictions18. 
But perhaps the most basic contradiction is implied already in objectification as such. As 
it has been discussed by Derrida (1981), Butler (2005), Balibar (2017) and others, the very 
externalization of the self into (written) language or material art is a self-effacing surrender 
 
18 Thus, for instance, the rearticulation of the Freudian death drive which is attempted here contains 
the contradiction that subjectivity is at once self-reproduction and self-overcoming. Or, we could 
move further into other theorems such as (diffuse) affectivity versus (focused) emotion as 
moments that presuppose and oppose each other in emerging practices and their motives (cf. 
Whetherell, 2012, Nissen and Sørensen, 2017). 
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to a cultural continuity that stretches far beyond any human life. According to Taylor (1975), 
this is already the main point in Hegel’s rearticulation of the Christian myth of resurrection. 
In that sense, “death strolls between letters” (Derrida, 1978, p. 87) of any text. Death, as a 
reduction of the living to the static, the frozen, the (for all practical purposes) eternal; but 
also as a resurrection. Through different types of art, the estrangement of our selves as dead 
objects – in libraries, museums and on internet sites – is what may emancipate us:   
In fact, total aestheticization does not block, but rather enhances, political action. Total 
aestheticization means that we see the present status quo as already dead, already abolished (Groys, 
2016, p. 110). 
Aestheticization may in this way enable a reflexive distance which emphasizes the social 
and historical situatedness of our selves. Emancipation affects and engages us as a ‘coming 
community’ imagined with these artifacts. However, the ‘we’ who now, hopefully, is a part 
of this is itself dissensual, contradictory, as will be its eventual constitution as collective. 
Utopias as imagined possible collectives are vital, but the future is only present as 
imagination carried by artifacts with contradictory meanings and dissensual experiences. It 
is with such artifacts that we negotiate who we are, as who and what we may become19. We 
should not fool ourselves – or oppress each other – by imagining a return, nor even a turn, 
to a collective of common sense that does not arise from or evolve into deferred meaning 
(cf. Lave, 2008). Rather, the community of any collective worth wanting to constitute is 
achieved precisely by struggling with inequalities and ‘dissensuses’ constituted by some 
kind of diversity; and by, in the same movement, learning to transform its defining 
categories and senses. What unites and defines us is the “politics inherent in” an art that 
“has broken the rules which make definite forms of feeling and expression correspond to 
 
19 We can always imagine something beyond those singular, earthly artifacts, but then precisely as 
pure transcendence, as that which is to come, as l’avenir (Derrida, 2005). 
Recognizing Motives: The Dissensual Self   •   123 
OUTLINES – CRITICAL PRACTICE STUDIES • Vol. 21, No. 2 • 2020 
www.outlines.dk 
specific characters or subject matters” (Rancière, 2009, p. 87). Such, we believe, are the 
collectives that we keep struggling to constitute (our selves with) in and around U-turn, its 
‘groups’, and its aesthetic documentation practices. 
Conclusion 
Attempting to write dialectics in this text, let us conclude with ourselves: We who write 
and read this article. Any writing on selfhood is self-refuting if it remains ‘about’, if it does 
not proceed to perform and self-reflect on its performativity. This makes it just as impossible 
to arrive at closure as Hegel famously claimed it was to establish a firm point of departure. 
Following the suggestions from our artist-counsellor collaborators, we have proposed 
aesthetic documentation as a way to understand and articulate – and thus to transform – 
practices of the self that would usually be regarded as psycho-therapy, counselling, or social 
work. To this end, reflections on art by theorists such as Vygotsky, Groys, Bourriaud, and 
first of all Rancière, have seemed useful. Here, aesthetics is a “specific regime for 
identifying and reflecting on the arts”, as “modes of doing and making” with “corresponding 
forms of visibility” (Rancière, 2004, p. 10). We have given hints to suggest that the ‘poetics’ 
or ‘style’ of conversation is thus not only highlighted and affirmed as such, as Carr and 
Smith seem content with achieving, but also criticized and rearticulated. This is what opens 
to an unfolding of aesthetic documentation beyond the confines of therapy. For this, 
aesthetics employs a deeper conceptualization of the arts as practices, one that appreciates 
mediation, objectification, and socio-cultural transformation.  
On the one hand, we are familiar with this already from the Vygotskian tradition. But as 
the radical equality and the dissensus created with artworks achieve prominence, we are 
forced to consider anew some existential dimensions of the self that we Vygotskians have 
mostly ignored: The self as relating to ourselves as living and dying; but also as self-
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overcoming, constituted in dramas of recognition that co-constitute community as 
collectives. For these aspects of the concept of the self, we have referred to philosophers 
such as Hegel, Kierkegaard, Derrida, and Butler. Their work may appear far-fetched and in 
some ways alien to us Vygotskians with our focus on agency. However, doing so seemed 
the only way to address the problematizations of agency that Sue and Lucy performed so 
convincingly. They reminded us how deep we must dig if we are to rearticulate the 
contemporary ideology of ‘motivation’. Our claim is that this ‘post-Vygotskian’ move is 
required if critical practice studies want to engage in the relations of recognition that 
constitute collectives to include people who are currently marginalized by the contemporary 
motivation ideology. On the other hand, at this point, if not before, the question arises 
whether you, dear reader, are still with us. Are we overstepping or pushing the boundaries 
of what can be recognized in academia as Critical Practice Studies?  
Of course, academia is founded on the hope of constituting more enduring communities. It 
is a vital quality of research that its writing constructs a perspective on situated historical 
practices sub speciae aeternitatis. This seems to invoke the problematic image of an eternal 
community, a City of God modernized as a World of Science, emancipated from the burden 
of any earthly politics20. We cannot reflect ourselves except through a critical rearticulation 
of this image. This rearticulation begins with the contradiction inherent in the historicity of 
precisely that construction of eternity. Not, however, in the shape of a global critique of 
Modernity, to which the hidden dream of a post-modern, radically emancipated “community 
of those without community” (Derrida 2005) would remain constitutive. We must affirm 
the flip side of the paradox, too, that it is only by transcending historical singularity that 
 
20 Or at least of all politics except the totalitarianism of The One and Only Politics to Finish all 
Politics – that which Rancière calls ’meta-politics’ (1999) 
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historicity can be reflected as such, in science as in aesthetics21. We cannot but keep trying 
to transcend the situated, even if in situated ways.  
If the aesthetic regime discerns new distributions of the sensible, new makings of sense, 
the theoretical regime constructs new accountabilities, new ways to think and argue 
meaning. In the Novum, the moment of newness as such, the two overlap. But we enter into 
it with an awareness of the great continuities that any one person or collective can only 
slightly modify. A socio-cultural-historical approach recognizes cultural tradition – 
aesthetic, scientific, theoretical, etc. – as practices, artefacts and societies with deep roots 
still alive, yet subject to radical transformations. This suggests a more modest reflection on 
our motives for writing and reading articles like this. With the exponential growth in text 
and archives, our surrender to the transcendence of cyberspace will not be easily sublated 
in the form of our resurrection as founding fathers or mothers, nor as legitimate heirs, or 
even as torch-bearers, of a (Vygotskian, Marxist, Hegelian etc.) dynasty.  
We must face the contemporaneity of our hopes for the future. It is these we construct here. 
The future is present. By evoking the imagined future reader and the world in which she 
may find our arguments persuasive and relevant, these hopes defer meaning and remake 
sense as ways to act, to practice, to live, as human beings. 
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